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Civil No. 7723

In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
N. J. MEAGHER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
JoE T. JuHAN, PAUL STocK,
RAY PHEBus, et al.,
Defendants arnd Appellants.

ANSWER OF RESPONDENT MEAGHER TO

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE.
PRELIMINARY S'TATEMENT.

Doubtless the Court has noted that amicus curiae fails
to support his own suggestions that this decision fetters
the oil industry, or has some bearing upon conservation,
or runs counter to the interests of the State of Utah
with respect to the development of its oil.
Lacking any showing with respect to the foregoing, we
must assume that amicus curiae has no other interests in
this decision than his concern that this Court is unable
to decide a quiet title action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This is confirmed by the fact that, although the issues
raised by amicus curiae in some instances vary slightly
in form from those raised by appellants, in substance
they are identical.
Respondent appreciates that mere repetition not only
fails to aid, but adds to the burden of this Court. Yet,
to avoid any inference that respondent concedes any
point made by amicus curiae, this brief will again answer
each matter touched upon by him, or will refer to the
answers contained in the briefs on file.

STA'TEMENT OF POINTS.

1. There was no violation of the prior mandate of
this Court.
2. The lessee's rights are divisible.
3. The document transferred Stock's interest In the
lease to Meagher.
4. The cause of action now asserted by Meagher is
not a departure from his original cause of action.
5. Two or more persons can own undivided interests
in the exclusive right to drill for oil.
6. The document was supported by legal consideration.

ARGUMENT.
1. THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE PRIOR
:MANDkTE OF THIS COURT.

Amicus curiae cites cases holding that "where an appellate court disposes of the entire case by directing just
what judgment shall be entered'' no other matters can
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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be passed upon by the trial Court. (Helper State Bank
v. CrHs, 95 Utah 320, 81 P. 2d 359.) Respondent takes
no issue with this well established principle.
But in the first appeal this Court made no attempt to
dispose of the entire case. In that opinion this Court
referred to the transfers from Stock to Meagher, from
Unitah Gas Co. to Meagher, from Valley Fuel Co. to
Meagher, and from Phebus to Juhan. The c·ourt expressly
declined to pass on the legal effect of those documents
saying ''it may be that some of these transfers and assignments which, so far as the abstract is concerned,
appear inconsistent, are in fact merely efforts to clear
title by relinquishment of possible claims. They do not,
however, affect the issue as submitted to us.'' In the
face of this clear expression of the limited issues before
this Court in the first appeal, amicus curiae sees fit to
say: "on the first appeal the Stock paper was given full
consideration and, notwithstanding its execution and delivery, the Court held the lease to be outstanding and
Meagher's title subordinated thereto." (Emphasis ours.)
There is no question but that .Meagher's title as landowner is subject to the lease. But amicus curiae misunderstands the issues presented on the first appeal if by
"full consideration" he means that this Court made any
effort to decide the legal effect of the quitclaim Meagher
received from Stock. The first decision did determine
that the lease exists. But it did not determine who owned
it, or the extent of the interests of the various parties.
Following the first decision the following principle came
into force, which amicus curiae quotes on p. 11 of his

brief:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''When the judgment of a trial court has been reversed in an error proceeding, the court should retrace its steps to the point where the first rr1aterial
error occurred. It should put the litigants back where
·they were when the initial mistake was committed."
(Missouri K & T Trust Co. v. Clark, 60 Neb. 406, 83
N.W. 202.)
This also is well established law, and it was followed
precisely by the trial Court. Once the trial Court was
instructed by this Court that the lease was valid, it retraced its steps to the point where the error occurred
and continued this quiet title action for the purpose of
determining what interests in the lease were owned by
the litigants. Indeed, if this had not been done there
would have been no judicial determination of appellants'
own claims in the lease, a determination which they specifically asked the Court to make in their Counterclaims.

The mandate of this Court has been carried out.

2. THE LESSEE'S RIGHTS ARE DIVISIBLE.

This subject has been urged by appellants and has been
answered. The substantial values frequently encountered
in oil properties naturally lead to extreme and elaborate
division of interests. Appellants themselves have recognized the divisibility of these same lessee's rights by the
various agreements they have made among themselves.
(See Respondent's Answer to Petition for Rehearing,
pp. 3-5.)
·In- Allies ;Oil Co. v. Ayres, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720, in
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5
towards each other exactly the same relations as though
they owned the land in common.''
Moreover, "a tenant in common has the right to divest
himself of his entire interest in the common property
and thus bring into association with his former co-tenants
one who has theretofore been a stranger to the title, and
this he may do independently and without the consent of
such co-tenants." (Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R.I. 443, 96
Atl. 307.) This subject is discussed and additional authorities are cited in Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-32.
L

3. THE DOCUMENT TRANSFERRED STOCK'S INTEREST
IN THE LEASE TO MEAGHER.

This point has been presented by the parties in interest. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 69 et seq.). Amicus curiae
repeats the argument that Meagher did not seek an
interest in the property but merely sought to remove
a cloud on his title. But a cloud on one's title is, or
at least may be, an interest in the property. The only
way the owner of a superior title can clear it is to acquire
the interests of those who own, or claim- to own, inferior
titles. If the quitclaim which Stock gave Meagher did not
pass Stock's interest in the property to Meagher, to whom
did it pass~ Certainly Stock gave it up. Appellants seem
to argue that although Stock's interest passed out of him,
it went to Phebus, who was Stock's co-lessee at the time.
That would mean that a lessor seeking to clear his tit~e:
from the claims of co-lessees would get nothing until he.
had received the quitclaim of the last co-lessee, ..for appelS.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
lants Sponsored
mustby theconcede
that
if Act,
Meagher
had
received an idenLibrary Services
and Technology
administered by the Utah
State Library.
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tical quitclaim from Phebus as he received from Stock, he
would thereby have cleared his title of the entire lease.
Certainly Stock did not quitclaim to Phebus when he made
his transfer to Meagher. Thus it must follow that the
transfer was a quitclaim from Stock to Meagher of whatever it was that Stock owned. Had Meagher succeeded
in obtaining the same release from Phebus, he would have
gathered in all outstanding lessee's rights, and the lease
would have merged in Meagher's senior title. But having
obtained a quitclaim from Stock alone, Meagher must and
does recognize that the Phebus interest remains outstanding.
Meagher's rights, obtained from Stock, are in nowise
inconsistent with, or antagonistic to, the rights of Phebus
and his assigns any more than would have been the case
if Stock had retained his interest but had declined to participate in the development.
A co-tenant may extract ore from the common property
and sell it without the consent of his co-tenant, but he
must account for the proceeds, less the reasonable expenses (Silver King v. Silver King, 204 Fed. 166).
Each tenant in common may sell his interest without
regard to the wishes of the other. Thus, tenants in common who join in a contract to sell are bound even though
some co-tenants did not sign and are not bound (Ward v.
Walker (Tex. Civ. App.), 159 S.W. 320).
Owners of undivided portions of oil and gas rights
are tenants in common and each may transfer his own
portion without the consent of the other (Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99, 23 P. 2d 633 ).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Each tenant in common has the right to alienate his,
own interest regardless of the wishes of his co-tenant
(Garner v. Anderson, 67 Utah 533, 248 P. 496).
A tenant in common may assign his share of rents and
profits without obtaining the consent of any co-tenant
(Knudson v. Powers, 56 So. Dak. 613, 230 N.W. 282).

A co-tenant of oil and gas rights may convey his indi~
vidual interest without the consent of other co-tenants
(Wolfe v. Stanford, 179 Okla. 27, 64 P. 2d 335).
Respondent submits that amicus curiae has added
nothing to the discussion of this point (See Respondent's
Brief, p. 47 et seq., and Respondent's Answer to the
Petition for Rehearing, p. 8 et seq.).

4. THE CAUSE OF ACTION NOW ASSERTED BY MEAGHER IS
NOT A DEPARTURE FROM HIS ORIGINAL CAUSE OF ACTION.

In raising this point, amicus curiae merely rephrases
the issue as to whether the trial Court properly permitted Meagher to amend his reply (See Respondent's
Brief, p. 11 et seq., and Respondent's Answer to the
Petition for Rehearing, p. 5 et seq.).

While the issue was properly raised as a matter of
pleading, it is questionable whether any amendment to th~
reply was necessary. The complaint claimed a fee title
which mcludes all outstanding interests in the property.
Under such claim a plaintiff may prove any title he
owns, notwiths'tanding that it be less than a fee simple.
Respondent submits that the issue presented by amicus
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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curiae presents no new problem, and his argument affords
no basis for revision of this Court's decision on the point.

5. 'TWO OR MORE PERSONS CAN OWN UNDIVIDED INTERESTS
IN THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO DRILL FOR OIL.

On pages 21-22 of the brief of amicus curiae, he criticizes Paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law. He bases his
criticism upon the startling assertion that ''one cannot
have an undivided one-half interest in the exclusive right
to drill oil lands''. This is grossly erroneous. If two
people own oil lands, or an oil lease, they are tenants
in common. Together they own the exclusive right to
drill. But as co-tenants or co-lessees each owns an undivided one-half interest therein. This does not mean that
either owns a right to drill which excludes his co-tenant.
Nor is there any confusion in the conclusions of law
in this respect. Paragraph 4 clearly defines the lessee's
rights and properly states that the lessee's rights include
the exclusive right to drill for and produce oil and gas.
The same paragraph states that Meagher owns an undivided one-half interest in the lessee's rights. There is
nothing in the findings or conclusions or in the decision
of this Court which grants to Meagher, as against his
co-lessees, any . exclusive rights to drill. Nor can the
converse be found. However, in defining and determining
who the co-lessees are, the decision does recognize that
their collective rights, as against all others, include the
exclusive right to drill for and p·roduce· oil.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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6. THE DOCUMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY
LEGAL CONSIDERATION.

This point is covered by Respondent's Brief, p. 47
et seq. It is expressly covered in the opinion where
authorities are cited augmenting those suggested in the
briefs. Amicus curiae offers none.

CONCLUSION.

Respondent submits that amicus cur~ae has added
nothing to the vigorous presentation of appellants' case.
Nor has he even made an attempt to demonstrate that
any principle is involved which may have any effect
upon the development of the oil law of the State of
Utah. There is none. Nor has he discussed any principle
of general law with re.spect to which this Court requires
his guidance.
Dated, April 27, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT vAN DAM,
GILBERT c. WHEAT,
Attorneys for Respondent
Nl. J. Meagher.
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